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Abstract 
Economies are open complex adaptive systems far from thermodynamic equilibrium, 
and neo-classical environmental economics seems not to be the best way to describe 
the behaviour of such systems. Standard econometric analysis (i.e. time series) takes a 
deterministic and predictive approach, which encourages the search for predictive 
policy to ‘correct’ environmental problems. Rather, it seems that, because of the 
characteristics of economic systems, an ex-post analysis is more appropriate, which 
describes the emergence of such systems’ properties, and which sees policy as a social 
steering mechanism. With this background, some of the recent empirical work 
published in the field of ecological economics that follows the approach defended 
here is presented. Finally, the conclusion is reached that a predictive use of 
econometrics (i.e. time series analysis) in ecological economics should be limited to 
cases in which uncertainty decreases, which is not the normal situation when 
analysing the evolution of economic systems. However, that does not mean we should 
not use empirical analysis. On the contrary, this is to be encouraged, but from a 
structural and ex-post point of view. 
 
Keywords:  Ecological economics, neo-classical environmental economics, 
empiricism, predictive analysis, complexity, post-normal science, policy. 
 
 
1. Introduction   
Ecological economics deals with, and is related to, policy generation and, in order to 
do this needs numerical data about both human and natural systems. It is the goal of 
this paper to analyse the role of empiricism in the framework of neo-classical 
environmental economics and ecological economics. After doing that, the paper 
defends a phenomenological and ex-post analysis to deal with the complexity of 
modern economies, by giving some examples of empirical work already done under 
this view.  
 
The concepts underlying ecological economics and neo-classical environmental 
economics will be outlined, to emphasise that the latter makes some strong implicit 
assumptions about the working of systems under its analysis (i.e. economic systems). 
These assumptions are compatible neither with the main characteristics of present 
                                                           




complex environmental systems nor with the nature of economies. This is why 
ecological economics deals with both the problems and the systems in an alternative 
way. 
 
The structure of the rest of the paper is as follows: Section 2 focuses on the 
conceptual structures in ecological economics and in neo-classical environmental 
economics from an evolutionary perspective based on the concept of time. Section 3 
presents the debate about the role of policy for sustainability purposes. Section 4 
presents the position of these two schools of economic thought on empirical analysis, 
focusing on time and evolution. With this background, Section 5 mentions some of 
the latest developments in empirical analysis that have been published in the field of 
ecological economics, and that are an example of what could be empirical analysis 
when dealing with complexity in ecological economics. Finally, Section 6 reaches the 
conclusion that a predictive use of econometrics in ecological economics should be 
limited to cases in which uncertainty decreases. This leads to presenting the way 
ahead regarding empirical analysis in ecological economics, and its relationship to 
policy formulation. 
 
2.  Conceptual structures in ecological economics and in neo-classical 
environmental economics 
2.1.   Neo-classical economics 
Neo-classical economics focuses on the exchange of goods and services among the 
economic agents, such as consumers and producers, emphasising the role of consumer 
preferences and resources endowments, to guarantee the economy’s equilibrium. As 
pointed out by Ruth (1993) the main characteristics of this approach are a 
concentration on market mechanisms, a focus on microeconomics instead of 
macroeconomics, static analysis (neglecting then the history of processes), linearity, 
and a consideration of the environment only as a given boundary. This means that the 
methodology developed by neo-classical economics, general equilibrium theory, 
guarantees the achievement of a solution in the allocation of scarce resources (Faber 
et al., 1996). 
 
To understand better neo-classical economics we might think that it follows classical 
mechanics in its description of the economic process. That is, production, 
consumption, or distribution are seen as single processes that can be analysed 
separately to achieve not only understanding of them, but also to make possible 
forecasting. In the words of Georgescu-Roegen (1971, p.319), it “is a mechanical 
analogue”. As in mechanics, economists are seeking “universal laws” that can be 
applied everywhere and regardless time. Once laws are defined and basic principles or 
axioms are accepted, then this economics must be a theoretical science, deductive, 
and deterministic, capable of finding unique optimal solutions.  
 
Since neo-classical economics follows mechanics, where all processes are reversible, 
its equations and models are also ‘time symmetric’, where time is just a cardinal 
magnitude, which can, therefore, be added or subtracted (Beard and Lozada, 1999). 
At this point it is worth mentioning Georgescu-Roegen’s distinction between ‘time’ 
and ‘Time’. Using his own words (1971, p.135), “T represents Time, conceived as the 
stream of consciousness or, if you wish, as a continuous succession of “moments”, but 
t represents the measure of an interval (T’, T’’) by a mechanical clock” (emphasis in 




that is, to be a-historic, because they are considering mechanical time, instead of 
historical Time. This distinction is relevant since is related to Prigogine’s (Nicolis and 
Prigogine, 1977; and Prigogine and Stengers, 1984) Second Arrow of Time, which in 
words of Proops (1983: 357), is “the tendency of certain systems to become more 
complex and more structured”.  
 
Neo-classical natural resource and environmental economics, deals with the 
environment by analysing the threats of scarcity and pollution using the ideas 
described above. The methods developed have been: (i) optimisation in the case of 
managing natural resources (either renewable or exhaustible), and (ii) assigning 
property rights on pollution (or more generally externalities) in order to incorporate 
them into the price system, and thus, in the decision process under the market 
mechanism. This is why supporters of this approach are usually optimistic when 
dealing with environmental problems. For example, in the case of exhaustible 
resources they propose substitution between production factors, neglecting two basic 
issues. On the one hand, there are services provided by nature that are not 
substitutable at all (like the water or the carbon cycles). On the other hand, “from a 
physical perspective substitution cannot replace energy completely (including the 
energy of labour) because each factor of production depends ultimately on an input of 
net energy for its own production and maintenance” (Hall et al. 1986, p.46). It could 
be added that we can interpret the relationship between energy and matter, or any kind 
of production factor, as largely that of complementarity rather than substitutability. 
 
All of these characteristics of neo-classical economics, and its environmental branch, 
led to it being viewed as having difficulties dealing with new and complex problems, 
such as environmental problems. As Clark et al. (1995) pointed out, the mechanical 
character of economic models does not allow them to treat evolution or structural 
changes in the system. This fact led to new approaches as those proposed by 
ecological economics.  
 
2.2.  Economies as complex adaptive systems 
Economies are complex adaptive systems, that is, composed of large and increasing 
number of both components and of the relationships between them. Economies are 
also teleological systems (they have an aim, or end, the telos), but in a different way 
than non-human systems, which have only that of self-maintenance and development 
of the systems; economies incorporate new tele, those of the human beings belonging 
to the system, and they are capable of incorporating the guessed consequences of their 
fulfilment into the present decisions and definitions of new tele; they are thus 
anticipatory. They also learn from mistakes and from present developments, and they 
react, by changing both the actions undertaken and the tele defined; they are thus self-
reflexive. They also have the ability to adapt to new changing boundary conditions (a 
property also shown by non-human systems), but they may consciously alter the 
boundary conditions. This is why the economy, as a human system, can be understood 
as a complex, adaptive, self-reflexive, and self-aware system (see Kay and Regier, 
2000, for more details). 
 
When analysing their structure, economic systems are nested hierarchical systems. In 
the case of economic systems, we can distinguish several subsystems within them, 
and every sector may be split into different industrial ‘types’ (sharing common 




energy between them, reflecting the interconnected nature of those systems (the 
output of one sector enters other sector as input, and vice versa). That is, “downward 
and upward causation imply feedback between different levels of description in the 
hierarchy (…) [then], in mathematical terms it implies additional complexity and non-
linearity such that an economic equilibrium is no longer evident and certainly cannot 
be easily calculated” (van den Bergh and Gowdy, 2003). 
 
Thus, the increased complexity of economies, their nested hierarchical nature, and the 
fact that they show adaptive and evolutionary behaviour, gives rise to two parallel 
outcomes. One is the non-linear behaviour, even chaotic behaviour that these systems 
show. This is a short run process that involves a given structure and the difficulty in 
comprehending it by using the traditional methods of analysis based on hard 
(quantitative) modelling. The other is the emergence of novelty, which is long run, 
and involves changes in the structures. An alternative way of presenting this is by 
using the concepts of phenotypic evolution (different realisations of potentialities of 
the systems, which are susceptible of prediction) and genotypic evolution (emergence 
of new institutions or techniques, which by definition are unpredictable; that is, new 
potentialities) (Faber and Proops, 1998). Therefore, they are contextual by nature, 
depending on one particular space and time scale, and so they have to be analysed, 
taking one specific time and space scale into account. Since the parameters do change, 
this fact brings uncertainty up to the scene in the form of the selection of the set of 
parameters to be used to characterise the structure of the system. That is, the question 
of who decides the set of parameters is relevant here. Moreover, because of the same 
characteristics, and because being anticipatory systems means that they incorporate 
possible future states into the present, there may be multiple equilibria. 
 
If this is the case and we cannot find regularities or periodicity in the evolution of the 
systems, they would be largely unpredictable. This is so because when the system 
suffers a sudden change that makes it move away from one attractor point to other 
thanks to a random fluctuation, a small change in the parameters may have large 
consequences (Gleick, 1987). This is the so-called Butterfly Effect, later called 
‘sensitive dependence on initial conditions’. If this is happening, then very small 
influences can no longer be neglected; this makes modelling and prediction hard. In 
this sense we must consider the future to be open and uncertain under a non-linear 
world (Haken and Knyazeva, 2000). 
 
However, this chaotic behaviour gives rise to new ordered structures within systems 
that can be approached from complex systems theory. In the words of Haken and 
Knyazeva (2000, p.59), “although the future is open, and there are a number of 
possible evolutionary ways for a complex system, not any arbitrary (either 
conceivable or desirable) evolutionary way is feasible in a given system”. This is so 
because history counts and once a path is taken, some others are closed forever (i.e. 
path dependency). This reduces the number of possible attractors, and it induces, 
again, non-linear behaviour in the development of the system. It also reflects 
irreversibility. One of the ways of improving the knowledge in that context is by 
finding historical regularities that may reflect the emergent properties of the systems. 
However we have to bear in mind that even if some regularities are found, there might 
not be any causal relationship between the processes or variables. Even, “it is also 
possible that no regularities will appear despite the existence of causal relations 





Thus, even though the future is open, only some of the evolutionary paths are feasible 
and can develop, giving rise to different attractors. Haken and Knyazeva (2000) put it 
in these terms, “only the structures being in accordance with the inner evolutionary 
trends of the systems can arise. And nothing else but select meta-stable structures can 
be constructed in the system. These are a kind of evolutionary laws of prohibition” 
(emphasis in the original). These laws tell us that we cannot have equilibrium, and 
that the meta-stable structure has to be compatible with the internal constraints of the 
system. However, contrary to neo-classical economics, these do not tell us anything 
about what kind of systems or solutions we are going to have. 
 
2.3. Ecological  economics 
Ecological economics takes production, or the transformation of energy and materials, 
as one of its focal points, as it was done by classical economic thought, but it uses in 
its analysis the insights derived from thermodynamics, i.e. the second law of 
thermodynamics that introduced the issue of irreversibility. It is, then, an evolutionary 
science. An evolutionary science deals with historical events, and the processes 
between the events; that is, it deals with the issue of time. Using Georgescu-Roegen’s 
distinction about time, it can be said that an evolutionary science deals with historical 
‘Time’, whereas neo-classical economics deals with mechanical ‘time’, so neo-
classical economics cannot be considered as an evolutionary science. 
 
Ecological economics also deals with new complex adaptive systems, as presented 
above. Ecological economics, thus, unlike neo-classical environmental economics, 
focuses, among other things, on evolution of economies, on the process of becoming, 
on structural change, and the emergence of novelty (in the form of technological 
change, for example), all features shown by complex adaptive systems. The presence 
of novelty, the feedback mechanisms between the different levels of the hierarchy, 
and their anticipation, ensure that uncertainty is always present when dealing with 
these systems. This is one reason to ask for a new epistemology, as it is done in the 
next section. In fact, the more research we apply, the more uncertainty is generated, 
new questions arise, and new relationships between variables are found. In words of 
Faber and Proops (1998, p.110) when talking of environmental problems, “very often 
they involve the emergence of unpredictable events (novelty) (…) this implies that the 
simple sequence of problem → science → technique → solution is not necessary 
valid. On the contrary, we experience that our increasing knowledge may even 
impede the investigation for solutions”. This fact causes the issue of unpredictability, 
very often present when analysing environmental problems, and therefore relevant for 
ecological economics, and especially for policy generation. 
 
3.  The role of policy 
In economics, the role of policy is viewed differently depending on the school of 
thought taken. Neo-classical environmental economics conceives of the existence of 
policy based in economic analysis. It analyses market failures that induce 
environmental externalities, and tries to design policy to ‘correct’ these failures, and 
eventually give optimality. To do that, it uses the tools explained before in Section 
2.1. 
 
However, the new environmental problems are characterised by the following traits: 




urgently needed (Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1991), as we saw in Section 2.2 when 
dealing with complex economies. In this context, ecological economics defends a new 
epistemology to deal with complexity. So, in this context dominated by uncertainty 
and ignorance (we do not know what we do not know), a new approach to tackle these 
problems is needed. This approach has been called “poststructural” or “post-modern” 
(Denzin, 1994), "civic science" O’Riordan (1996), or “post-normal science” 
(Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1991). Ecological economics is said to be an example of post-
normal science (Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1994). 
 
In this approach it is not said that present scientific knowledge is no longer valid or 
applicable, but rather, that there exist some emergent problems characterised by 
complexity and uncertainty in which the “normal” science can not be used with the 
traditional methods alone (i.e. the sequence of problem → science → technique → 
solution mentioned above).  
 
In post-normal science it is admitted that objective reality can never be captured 
because of the inherent changing characteristics of the systems analysed, and that 
research is influenced by values of the researcher and, therefore, there is no value-free 
science (Denzin and Lincoln, 1994; Prigogine and Stengers, 1984). With this 
background, policy-making becomes a multidimensional and multifaceted process 
(Rist 1994) in which research is only one source of knowledge among others (such as 
common sense, beliefs, etc.) that seek to influence the final result.  
 
In post-normal science, research and knowledge have not the intention of providing 
policy-makers with a solution to the problem avoiding the need for them to take the 
political decision, and legitimating all of their acts. Rather, the idea is to create a 
shared contextual understanding about the issue (Rist 1994) in such a way that we 
keep informed all of the actors involved in the process of decision-making, but letting 
them reach a satisfactory compromise solution. This compromise solution will not 
have the aim of being a reflection of ‘truth’, but rather it will be a socially constructed 
view of reality (Clark et al. 1995), an agreed understanding of both the problem and 
the ways of tackling it.  
 
As Kay et al. (1999, p.737) said, “The program of post-normal science is to provide a 
basis for the understanding necessary to unravel complexity (emergence, irreducible 
uncertainty, internal causality), so that we may successfully anticipate, when possible, 
and adapt, when appropriate or necessary, to changes in the self-organizing systems of 
which we are an integrated and dependent part”. 
 
Post-normal science is, thus, about assuming that in both science and the process of 
decision-making there exist value judgements, and it is proposed, therefore, that we 
have to guarantee the quality of the process of decision-making rather than the final 
result, because there is no objective truth (Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1994). To do that, 
we should shift from a substantive or result-oriented rationality to a new procedural 
rationality (Simon, 1983), in which the process of knowledge generation is the 
relevant issue instead of the focus being on the final outcome. Such procedural 
rationality would imply an extension of the peer review community to people from 
other disciplines and to people affected by the issue. The work would be to manage 
the uncertainty that characterises every field to get the highest quality information we 




essential for maintaining the quality of the process of resolution of problems of 
reflexive complex systems” (Martinez-Alier et al., 1998, p.282).  
 
In sum, in ecological economics, as a post-normal science, policy is thus seen as a 
social steering mechanism implying the need to engage all stakeholders in reaching 
consensus. 
 
4.  Empirical analysis under complexity 
As noted by Ramsay (1998), empiricism is based on the idea that knowledge of the 
world is generated by experience rather than by reason. However, inside empirical 
analysis we shall focus here only in two main branches, the positivist approach, and 
the phenomenological (or interpretivist) approach. 
 
The positivist approach tries to use the “scientific method” by deducing theories as a 
result of formulating and testing hypotheses based on statistical data analysis. It 
formulates hypotheses on cause-effect relationships and tests them. If they pass the 
tests, this is the basis for a future generally applicable law generated by induction. 
This approach assumes that the subject of the study, i.e. the functional relations that 
define the relationships between the variables describing the system, are uniform and 
unchanging. For example, Heckman (2001, p.3), notes, “empirical research is 
intrinsically an inductive activity, building up generalizations from data, and using 
data to test competing models, to evaluate policies and to forecast the effects of new 
policies or modifications of existing policies”. Under this partial view on empiricism 
it is very difficult to account for change and evolution.  
 
The phenomenological approach, on the other hand, takes a different view of the 
subject under analysis than the positivist one. It acknowledges that when dealing with 
human systems, these have the intrinsic characteristics of changing and evolving in 
time; that is, the characteristic of becoming, due to external factors (i.e. shocks) or to 
internal causes, such as changes in preferences, technologies, or institutions (i.e. 
genotypical evolution as explained in Section 2.2). This fact makes it impossible to 
consider them as uniform and unchanging, so, in order to explain them, we have first 
to understand them.  
 
Neo-classical environmental economics defends a position favourable to the use of 
predictive analysis and thus to the positivist approach. It defends the notion that ex-
post analysis can give insights about the structures of the systems, and by 
extrapolating them into the future, can generate an ex-ante prediction of the 
development of variables, which can then be used for policy. In particular, neo-
classical environmental economics supports an ex-post analysis for ex-ante 
predictions because is implicitly based in classical mechanics where that is possible. 
This is because the basic characteristics of physical systems are described by 
universal laws; that is, they are not subject to structural change (i.e. gravity is stable, 
and so on). But this is not the case with biological systems and, in particular, human 
systems, where the underlying characteristics of systems, and therefore the parameters 
that we use to describe those characteristics, are constantly evolving, making 
prediction much more problematic (Faber et al., 1996). So, neo-classical 
environmental economics would be extrapolating past results into the future by 
assuming two things; one, that the parameters defining both the system and the 




functional relationship between the variables also remains stable for the period of time 
being predicted. For modern economic systems, these assumptions seem not to apply, 
since systems are constantly evolving and in the process of becoming, and therefore, 
if we want our representation of them to be updated, both the parameters and the 
functional relationships between them should evolve as well. 
 
Ecological economics, therefore, can be considered as representative of the 
phenomenological approach. Since it deals with complexity, and complexity is 
characterised by irreversibility and stochasticity (Prigogine, 1987), it concludes that 
linear deterministic models are ineffective. And since it is an evolutionary science, it 
defends that all understanding regarding a system or a process is context dependent.  
 
5.  Recent empirical work in the field of ecological economics 
With this background on how the conceptual structures of both neo-classical 
environmental economics and ecological economics can be defined, and with the 
different roles of policy and empirical analysis that each discipline defends, the next 
step is to proceed with an exemplification of the kind of empirical work that is 
suggested to be carried out in ecological economics when dealing with complex 
systems.  
 
Some of the work published in the field of ecological economics deals with complex 
systems in a simple way, for example by assuming constancy of the structure of 
agents’ preferences (neglecting irreversibility or the history of processes). Some 
assume linearity and constancy in both the parameters and the relationships between 
the variables defining the systems; that is, stability in the genotypes. With this 
analysis, they can recommend policies based on the results of their projections, that is, 
based in the extrapolation of past results. Then we can say that ‘science’ seeks to 
‘model’ the genotype so it can predict the phenotype. But, scientific data is only on 
the phenotype (the realisation or representation of the potentiality of that system). So, 
if the phenotype changes, observations on phenotypes are a poor basis for modelling 
and prediction. This is what is happening with an important portion of empirical work 
in ecological economics, that they are not matching the technique to the problem 
analysed. They are not keeping updated the set of parameters and functional 
relationships to the changes in the genotype or the basic characteristics of the systems; 
that is, to their evolution or process of becoming. One could think, therefore, there is 
not much difference with the methods applied by neo-classical environmental 
economics. 
 
There is, however, at least another way of understanding empirical analysis in 
ecological economics. Perrings and Walker (1997) use a model of resilience and 
empirical analysis to explain the importance of fire in the self-organisation of semi-
arid rangelands, being a vehicle of a destructive creation phase. That is, they explain 
the role of fire as a trigger of the shifting of the system from one meta-equilibrium to 
another. Another example is that of Jackson and Marks (1999), where the authors 
analyse the past distribution of consumer expenditure in the UK for a period of time, 
identifying some patterns of behaviour with different consequences upon the 
environment that can be accounted for when deriving policy. However, one of the 
topics in which this kind of analysis has been more successful is that of the 
environmental Kuznets curve, because it relates the evolution of income (and 




or use of materials. The environmental Kuznets curve looks at first sight as a 
hypothesis which can be retained or discarded according to relatively simple 
econometric work. Some authors find an inverted U pattern, i.e. an improvement in 
(some) environmental indicators at sufficiently high levels of income, and then 
conclude with an ex-ante prediction that growth is good for (at least part of) the 
environment. Some authors find not an inverted U curve but rather an N, implying 
deterioration at still higher levels of income. Other authors find more complicated 
patterns (with "attractor" points) (see Rothman (1998), Suri and Chapman (1998), 
Unruh and Moomaw (1998) or De Bruyn and Opschoor (1997)). This looks as a 
debate among equation-fitting empiricists. My point is that it is not, in the following 
sense. The authors I praise here, include beyond the equations, a narrative in which 
punctual technological changes (say, from coal to gas), or environmental policy (one-
time price increases like for oil in 1973, or the introduction of an eco-tax), or a 
cultural change in consumer or public awareness of pollution, may play roles in the 
shape of the EKC. Then, their explanations resemble more those of socio-economic-
environmental historians; they become complex and contextual, with little predictive 
contents.   
 
Recently, another group of papers dealing with societal metabolism have tackled the 
issue of complexity in economic systems with an alternative methodology. In 
particular, the papers use a new approach, called Multiple-Scale Integrated 
Assessment of Societal Metabolism (MSIASM), in relation to sustainability of human 
society. A detailed presentation of theoretical aspects, a numerical validation, and 
applications in the form of case studies have been presented elsewhere (Giampietro 
and Mayumi, 2000a,b; Pastore et al., 2000; Ramos-Martin, 2001a; Falconi-Benitez, 
2001; Gomiero and Giampietro, 2001). In particular, Ramos-Martin (2001a), 
extending some research initiated before (Ramos-Martin, 1999, 2001b), dealt with the 
historical evolution of energy intensity in Spain to respond to the debate on the 
environmental Kuznets curve with a counterexample. It presented first the 
conventional view of energy intensity in energy economics, and later an evolutionary 
explanation of that evolution that stressed the non-linear behaviour of the variable as a 
contrast with other economies. Contrary to those economies, when representing a 
phase diagram for Spain, it showed that the energy intensity flipped between different 
‘attractor’ points, that is, it went through phases of stability (when moving around the 
two attractor points) and a transitional phase (when moving from one attractor to the 
other), showing that the hypothetical environmental Kuznets curve does not apply to 
the trajectory of energy intensity in Spain. Finally, a historical and biophysical 
analysis mixing different kinds of variables (GDP, working time, and energy 
consumption) gave interesting explanations to the evolution of energy intensity (such 
as the increasing responsibility of the household sector in its increase), exemplifying 
the necessity for using parallel non-equivalent descriptions of the same facts when 
dealing with complex systems because the generation of redundancy, or ‘mosaic 
effects’, among the various pieces of information improves the robustness of the 
analysis and gives the possibility of getting new insights not shown by the 
conventional economic representation alone. 
 
The relevant here is that all of these papers took the phenomenological approach and 
dealt with an ex-post understanding on how systems work, by trying to find statistical 
regularities that reflect the underlying characteristics of economic systems, but 




aim of these papers was to explain how the system ‘got there’, what were the 
mechanisms underlying the behaviour of some key variables, such as energy 
consumption. This is why I think they are an example of the kind of empiricism I 
understand should be applied when dealing with environmental problems that belong 
to the realm of post-normal science in open complex economic systems. This 
particular type of methodology fits better with the characteristics of complex 
economic systems as presented above in Section 2.2.  
 
 6. The  way  ahead 
The criticism presented here on the use of the positivist version of empirical analysis 
does not mean that we cannot conduct some forecasts about the future behaviour of 
the variables. We can do it, provided that we are analysing the variable or the system 
when they are near or at, one attractor point (i.e. they are meta-stable) or when they 
are following a well-established trend identified historically. In these cases, when the 
level of uncertainty decreases, prediction is possible, under certain limitations (a 
sudden change is always possible). However, when the system is at a bifurcation point 
(i.e. in the very moment of shifting from one attractor point), prediction is not 
possible because we might have novelty expressed either by an external shock or by 
internal causality, which will drive the system towards one attractor or other. For 
example, internal causality may be caused by feedback loops between the different 
hierarchical levels of the system. We should bear in mind that when the differences in 
scale are too large, it is almost impossible to relate the non-equivalent information 
obtained from the different levels, making prediction almost impossible. This is a 
reflection of the unavoidable indeterminacy of the representation of these systems 
across scales (Mandelbrot, 1967). 
 
So, if a basic characteristic of complex systems is that “they can only be 
approximated, locally and temporarily, by dynamical systems” (Rosen, 1987, p.134), 
but we still try to control them by using predictive dynamic models, we may face a 
“global failure” (Rosen, 1987, p.134, emphasis in the original) in the form of a 
growing discrepancy between what the system is doing and what the model predicted. 
This is one of the reasons why normal science is losing credibility among citizens, 
and why post-normal science, with its interest not in finding ‘truth’ but on giving 
good quality information for the decision-making process, is viewed as a way out of 
that difficulty. 
 
When analysing data, in order to tackle complexity we can adopt the idea of 
triangulation (Ramsay, 1998) or parallel non-equivalent descriptions (Giampietro and 
Mayumi, 2000a). This idea consists of using more than one source for the data, 
analysing the data with different theories or models, or using different hierarchical 
levels at the same time, in order to gain robustness in our analysis and give more 
credibility to scientific analysis. This will bring redundancies, which are rather 
positive since they will reinforce the argument or the regularities that we may find. 
This is thus an argument in favour of a inter-disciplinary approach to sustainability, in 
which the different readings of the different disciplines are seen as compatible in 
generating the overall understanding of the structure of the system, and its 
development.  
 
If the use of empiricism for prediction by econometrics (i.e. time series analysis) is 




interested in evolution, the process of becoming, structural change and the emergence 
of novelty; therefore, first we have to bear in mind that since stochastic processes are 
dominant in nature, scientific theories should be more down-to-earth, based in direct 
observations. Then, we should use empirical analysis not to give the exact values of 
the parameters in future, but to discriminate between those theories which are 
consistent with reality and those which are not. In cases of high uncertainty we 
should, therefore, describe and understand instead of seeking to explain and predict. 
Hence, we would be closer to the generation of scenarios by using narratives (i.e. soft 
modelling) rather than to forecasting (i.e. hard modelling). This is so because the 
nature of evolutionary complex adaptive systems, characterised by irreversibility and 
stochasticity, with their numerous possible trends, their uncertainty, the emergence of 
novelty, makes them largely unpredictable. That is, ex-ante modelling is often not 
useful for policy. We have to admit that there are no deterministic explanations 
(universal and a-historical). Rather we can describe and understand these systems by 
finding historical and spatial, regularities, and by looking at the emergence of such 
systems’ properties. This leads us to admit that the knowledge we can obtain from 
complex systems is context dependent (Clark et al., 1995); it is dependent on the time 
window considered and also on the spatial context. This is the reason why, as pointed 
out by Boulding (1987), the failure in our predictions are not the responsibility of 
human knowledge itself. Rather, it reflects an inherent property of complex systems, 
that of unpredictability. Therefore, our failure might come either because we do not 
know the parameters of the system (ignorance) or because they change very rapidly 
(emergence of novelty, evolution) reflecting structural or genotypical change caused 
by external shocks or by internal causality within systems (e.g. chaotic behaviour). 
 
Science applied to the decision-making process under the post-normal science 
framework would then be limited to assessing the consequences of the different 
policies, and to providing a phenomenological narrative or interpretation of how the 
future might unfold (Kay et al., 1999); This is part of the process of guaranteeing 
transparency and fairness in the process of decision-making, by promoting a 
continuous dialogue with stakeholders and policy makers. Thus, “these narratives 
focus on a qualitative/quantitative understanding which describes: 
 
•  The human context for the narrative; 
•  The hierarchical nature of the system; 
•  The attractors which may be accessible to the system; 
•  How the system behaves in the neighbourhood of each attractor, potentially in 
terms of a quantitative simulation model; 
•  The positive and negative feedbacks and autocatalytic loops and associated 
gradients which organize the system about an attractor; 
•  What might enable and disable these loops and hence might promote or 
discourage the system from being in the neighbourhood of an attractor; and 
•  What might be likely to precipitate flips between attractors” (Kay et al., 1999, 
p.728). 
 
The implication of the argumentation presented before is that the evolution of 
complex systems is not fully predictable. This fact leads us, when dealing with 
sustainability, to the issue of incommensurability of values as a key characteristic that 
should distinguish ecological economics from environmental economics (Martínez-





Thus, the fact that the future is open has some repercussions from a policy 
perspective. This openness asks for what has been called ‘soft management’ by Haken 
and Knyazeva (2000). This has to be understood as encouraging flexibility in 
response to changing boundary conditions. This flexibility can be achieved by 
enhancing the diversity in the system. The more diversity, the more responses we will 
have to changing conditions, with more chances that one, or some of these responses, 
will be successful and will bring the system ahead in its development. That is, 
diversity increases the adaptive capacity of the system. This is something that Holling 
(1996), following Walker et al. (1969), called ‘ecological resilience’, in contrast to 
‘technical resilience’ which would be closer to finding and returning to the initial 
equilibrium. 
 
In conclusion, in complex systems prediction is very often not possible not only 
because the parameters defining the relationships between variables may change 
(phenotypic evolution), but also because the functional relation itself may also change 
(genotypic evolution) since they are involved in the process of becoming of the 
system, generating therefore more novelty. Consequently, a predictive use of 
econometrics (i.e. time series analysis) in ecological economics when dealing with 
complex systems should be limited to those non common situations in which 
uncertainty decreases. Rather, the phenomenological approach presented here, and 
exemplified by the papers mentioned in Section 5 dealing with an ex-post analysis, 
seems more suitable for ecological economics to deal with the issue of evolution of 
complex systems such as economies, involving novelty in the form of structural 
change. This may also include, as stated above, the use of econometric analysis to 
account for past developments and trends. At the end, history does count. 
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